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Introduction
In tumultuous times of financial crisis and government spending cuts across Europe, capitalism is increasingly 
challenged as a desirable economic system. One stereotypical view has it that, out of totalitarian socialism and 
capitalism, the latter is the ‘least bad’. But thankfully there are other alternatives to the capitalist economic 
system. This article looks specifically at how the production of goods and services can be non-capitalist, with 
reference to working real-life examples.
Many theorists on the Left would object to the idea that any kind of production embedded in today’s world 
dominant capitalist chains of production could be non-capitalist. As global production networks become more 
complex, each product and item we interact with in our daily lives bear the fingerprints of thousands, if not 
millions, of people (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977). As David Harvey puts it, how many people contributed to 
your breakfast this morning? (2010: 40). And the answer includes the people who cut down the trees to make 
the cardboard for the cereal box; who built the roads your food was transported on; who distilled the tar to 
make the tarmac for those roads; and so on... Therefore, so the argument might go, it is useless to attempt any 
ostensibly non-capitalist activity. But while an awareness of the complexity of global production networks is 
important for understanding global capitalism, it does not follow that any organization that interacts with 
capitalist organizations is itself necessarily capitalist. To use an analogy, if my grandmother was served 
breakfast by a young person, my grandmother is intricately linked to young people, but it is still intelligible to 
define her as elderly rather than young.
Authors such as J. K. Gibson-Graham have written extensively on non-capitalist economic relations, and they do 
so as a case in point: to 'open up possibilities' and 'dislocat[e] the hegemonic framing of capitalism' (2008: 615). 
As Gibson-Graham showed, something like half of the world's economic transactions are already non-capitalist 
ones, whether non-monetary transactions, unpaid housework, favors between friends, co-operatively organized 
production. In this staggering plethora of (re)productive modes, it turns out there are other places on the map to 
put one's finger on and set off to travel to (even if the water in a lake has previously flowed through a distant 
river). 
Several attempts have been made on the Left to present alternative social models for how a more holistically 
non-capitalist society could work. Branko Horvat in his magnum opus from 1982, The Political Economy of 
Socialism, offers a carefully designed socialist alternative model which is neither market-oriented nor 'etatist' 
(authoritarian socialist). Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel’s Parecon is a more recent contribution, laying out a 
design for a better social and political economy (Albert 2003). As theorists of radical political activism such as 
David Graeber and Naomi Klein point out, the thrust behind these alternative models is not to prefabricate every 
aspect of human interaction – rather, the bottom line of the radical Left and its proposed alternatives is about 
'real' democracy (Graeber 2002, Klein 2002). As Graeber puts it, ‘this is a movement about reinventing 
democracy. [...] It is about creating new forms of organization. It is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of 
organization are its ideology’ (Ibid. p. 70). In other words, these alternative models are all about enabling people 
to share opinions and think critically about the social models themselves.
Despite both academic and non-academic political writing having proposed such alternative models for over 
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two hundred years, there is still an overwhelming skepticism against the Left, with accusations that it offers no 
realistic alternatives (described in Graeber 2002, Klein 2002). My offering in this article is that this debate could 
do with some grounding in empirical examples. The article starts by describing how capitalism can be 
understood, then discusses several examples of productive organizations that operate without any of the central 
features of that description of capitalism. I focus my discussion on co-operatives, making it clear that, while the 
co-operative enterprise form itself is not necessarily anti-capitalist, certain interpretations of the globally 
accepted ICA co-operative principles (see Figure 2) can result in a non-capitalist enterprise. This is not merely a 
fanciful theory, but is reflected in many practical examples.
Conceptualizing Capitalism
In an American propaganda film from 1948, six high school students gather in a broadcasting room for a radio 
discussion about capitalism. In a cringe worthy and contrived conversation these well-groomed youngsters 
extol the virtues of the capitalist economic system. Comical though it may be sixty years later, the script for this 
film is remarkably insightful, and one of the actors offers a very useful summary of what makes the capitalist 
system special: 'Freedom of contract; competition; profit motive; private property. And what do they all add up 
to? Free enterprise! Well, that's what capitalism is!’ (Coronet Instructional Films 1948, emphasis added). Of 
course, this film was made as the US and USSR were plunging into Cold War – and when contrasted to other 
alternative economic systems than totalitarian socialism, it becomes clear that free enterprise and freedom of 
contract are features not only of capitalism. But the centrality and combination of competition, profit motive and 
private property (i.e. property owned by the bourgeois and not the laborers) do seem to be heavily recurring 
themes in theorists' descriptions of it (see e.g. Gibson-Graham 2006: 198, n.11; Klinedinst and Rock 2009; Wolff 
2006).
At this point it is worth noting that there are many different definitions of capitalism, and in some ways they are 
all stipulative, 'made up' to serve a particular analytical purpose. Capitalism is an abstract analytical concept and 
not a material object that we can put under a microscope. Rather than claiming to have defined capitalism once 
and for all, I merely wish to offer a working description of some, or hopefully most, of its main features to enable 
a discussion of how production that is not capitalist can exist and take shape in the present moment.
Let us then look at the three features that will be discussed in this article: bourgeois ownership, profit and 
competition. To start with, and as Marx focused a lot of attention on, capitalism is built on a distinction between 
owners of the means of production on the one hand, and wage laborers on the other. It should be pointed out 
here that Marx and the debate that followed him has tended to focus on the productive aspect of capitalism 
(indeed, capitalism as a Mode of Production) rather than reproductive aspects, such as housing or community 
organizing, or other aspects. My discussion in this article is therefore focused more on productive enterprises – 
workers' co-operatives – than other forms of co-operatives. 
The means of production are possessions that one can make an income from, such as, typically, an industrial 
machine or a factory building, as opposed to other more personal property such as your toothbrush or a 
photograph from your childhood. The means of production in any capitalist company are owned by capitalists, 
whether individuals, families or a larger collection of shareholders, and so are the products made by the 
company. Laborers, who own no means of production, only have their own labor power to make a living from, so 
they sell their labor power at a price that, in the free labor market, is as low as possible and is always lower than 
the value created by their own labor (Lukes 1985: 60). Hence there is in capitalism a continuous transfer of 
wealth from the laborers to the capitalists (what Marx would call exploitation), and the capitalists make an 
income from the mere fact that they own the means of production, without lifting a finger. It is also, by the same 
ownership logic, the capitalists who make the decisions in a company, and who have all the rights to the 
company that ownership entails. In other words, even in a conventional privately owned company that is not-
for-profit, a Marxist will find unequal and undesirable relationships between the owners of the company (who 
can make decisions that affect the laborers' working conditions) and the 'alienated' laborers (who have no direct 
say about their own workplaces or the products of their labor) (Lukes 1985: 80).
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Secondly, capitalism sees profit as the driving force and motivation behind any commercial undertaking. Adam 
Smith, one of the founding fathers of capitalism, wrote in his seminal work The Wealth of Nations that ‘[i]t is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard 
to their own self-interest’ (2009 [1776]: ch2). By this Smith did not strictly mean to say that profit is what makes 
us tick, but profit is the most straightforward way in which a company can cater for its owner’s self-interest. 
Profit in a quantitative, monetary sense, extracted by company owners from their employees, is specific to 
capitalism: for example, previous feudal economic models were not structured such that people primarily 
produced goods they themselves did not intend to use or own (whether individually or collectively) (Heilbroner 
2008).
Profit is not just a pleasant one-off event, and there is no point in capitalism where the maximum or appropriate 
level of profit has been reached. The point for capitalists is not only to continue to amass the same level of 
wealth every year, but to continuously increase the rate of profit, so that each new earning is bigger than the 
last. Or as David Harvey puts it, '[n]o matter how much money they earn, all CEOs and billionaires want, and can 
get, more' (2010:73). 
The third distinctive feature of capitalism here is that it strongly celebrates competition between firms, and most 
distinctively, competition between firms in the same market (what I will here call intra-market competition). Not 
only are firms encouraged by capitalist theory to compete against other firms in general, but different firms are 
also given the incentive to produce products or services that are similar to ones that already exist, thus 
competing for exactly the same customers.
Because of its track-record in creating and perpetuating inequality and human rights abuses – not surprising 
given the hierarchical and exploitative ideology it is built on – many find capitalism an undesirable economic 
system. Some people even structure their economic lives to avoid taking part in it altogether: some choose to 
separate themselves from society and live off a piece of land, or from rubbish bins – both very commendable 
forms of resistance (see e.g. Mark Boyle 2009). But once we attempt to engage in larger scale productive 
activities, questions arise about how we can organize ourselves and work together in an egalitarian, mutually 
beneficial, non-capitalist way. One type of productive organizational model that is attractive to anti-capitalists is 
the co-operative enterprise form. I will here discuss some co-operative examples with direct reference to how 
they function without deploying – in any meaningful way – any of the three distinctive features of capitalism I 
have listed.
Figure 1: Some Key Features of Capitalism
BOURGEOIS OWNERSHIP PROFIT (INTRA-MARKET) COMPETITION
Co-operatives Defined
A non-governmental co-operative organization can be defined as ‘an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned 
and democratically-controlled enterprise’ (ICA 2011a). In short, it is an enterprise owned, not by a private 
individual or external shareholders, but by co-op members. Membership structures vary, the most common 
forms being worker’s co-ops in which a stated minimum quantity of labor is a requirement for membership; 
consumers’ or users’ co-ops; secondary co-ops which are owned and operated by other co-ops; community co-
ops in which residence in a defined geographical area is a requirement for membership (Avon CDA 2013; Zeuli 
and Cropp 2004: ch4).
The two main differences between a co-operative and a shareholder company are that co-op members do not 
need to purchase any shares in order to have a democratic voice in the company, and that co-op members 
typically have one vote each in decision-making, as opposed to distributing votes by amount of money spent on 
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the company as is usually the case in shareholder companies (Ibid.). These two basic features do not per se 
challenge capitalism – therefore, anti-capitalist co-operatives go beyond the minimum definition. 
The most well-known and influential co-operative networking organization globally is the International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA). ICA’s members worldwide have agreed on a list of co-operative principles that co-ops 
can subscribe to voluntarily, outlined here in Figure 2. These principles are part in making co-operatives 
dramatically different from conventional companies in relation to social impact. In this article I will draw on 
several of the principles and discuss the ways in which they can – if interpreted in specific ways – inform a co-
operative enterprise structure that does not incorporate any of the three distinctive features of capitalism I have 
here laid out.
Figure 2: ICA’s Co-operative Principles
• Voluntary and open membership (and thereby ownership)
• Democratic member control
• Member economic participation (meaning that any surplus is shared between co-op members, reinvested in the 
co-op, or donated to other organisations)
• Autonomy and independence (meaning that no agreement entered with other organisations may jeopardize the 
members’ full democratic control over the co-op)
• Education, training and information (both for their members and the general public)
• Co-operation among co-operatives
• Concern for community
(Adapted from Crowell and Reed 2009: 148-9; ICA 2011a)
Regarding Bourgeois Ownership
ICA’s principles 1 and 2 lay out the key ways in which co-operatives can reject capitalism's distinction between 
the owner(s) of the company, and the laborers who sell their labor at the lowest price possible. Co-operative 
membership, and therefore I would argue ownership (Principle 1), is distributed equally among co-operative 
members. Anyone can be a member as long as they fulfill certain requirements – importantly these are not to do 
with wealth or class but about level of involvement with the organization (whether as a worker, volunteer, 
consumer or other). This is perhaps the most obvious and straightforward way in which co-operatives avoid the 
bourgeois ownership model: a co-op is owned by its members and not by some external master. 
Another crucial point is that ownership of a co-operative is usually not individual in the same way conventional 
(capitalist) shareholders' shares are. Co-operative members will typically not buy and sell their shares on 
financial markets, and membership of a co-operative usually does not mean the right to any particular 
percentage of its assets – at least not in non-profit co-operatives. In this sense, non-profit co-operative members 
own the organization collectively, and the emphasis is on making decisions based on the needs of the entire co-
operative and all its members, rather than on each shareholder's personal financial interest as in for-profits. 
For-profit co-operatives can of course float stocks openly on the market if they want to increase their 
profitability, one co-op that does this is CHS Inc, the enormous US American agricultural and energy co-
operative, which is today traded on NASDAQ. Even CHS, however, uses a system of 'preferred stock', whereby 
non-member investors cannot vote or have a say in the company, they can only make a financial surplus from it 
(CHS 2013). 
Ownership of a company and its assets can reasonably be said to have three main aspects: the right to use it and 
decide how it is to be used; the right to own any surplus made from it; and the responsibility to pay out any 
necessary costs to maintain it or compensate anybody who is negatively impacted by it (see e.g. Grunebaum 
1987). The latter is in most cases limited by law such that people involved in a 'limited company' are immune to 
full liability should their company go bust or otherwise incur any major costs. As for the second point of profit, 
as I will discuss below, the earning of profit is not applicable to non-capitalist co-operatives. The main 
interesting issue when it comes to the meaning of ownership in non-capitalist co-operatives thus centers on 
decision-making and use. To have ownership of a non-capitalist co-operative is largely about taking part in its 
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decision-making, and about sharing the use of it (whether, say, as an abode in a housing co-operative, a social 
centre in a community co-operative, or workplace in a worker's co-operative).
Here the ICA's second principle comes in, Democratic member control. Decision-making structures in co-
operatives vary, and I will here discuss two examples of co-operatives with contrasting structures, chosen 
because they can be seen as representing extremes at either end of a democratic spectrum. 
The first is the Basque (but now multinational) co-operative Mondragoón, which uses a multi-tiered structure of 
managers and elected representatives (Mondragoón 2013a; MacLeod and Reed 2009: 120-5). Mondragoón is a 
very large conglomerate consisting of many member co-operatives. Each co-op elects delegates to the Co-
operative Congress, which makes most major and strategic decisions. Congress elects a Standing Committee 
responsible for implementing the decisions made at Congress. The Standing Committee also elects the General 
Council, which has final authority (Ibid.). A map of Mondragoón’s decision-making structure can be seen in Figure 
3. 
Figure 3: Mondragón’s Decision-Making Structure
(Compiled from Mondragoón 2013a)
Mondragoón uses a system of trustee representatives (i.e. autonomous actors acting in the best interest of their 
representees, without the need to consult the latter ahead of specific decisions (Mondragoón 2013a,b; Dovi 
2006). This type of representation can be contrasted with delegated representation, which allows 
representatives only to relay the expressed opinions of their constituents. The use of trustee representatives 
means that officers higher up in Mondragoón’s representational pyramid can exercise discretion when 
implementing and evaluating decisions, but are monitored by their electorate and can be voted out if they make 
unpopular moves (Mondragoón 2013b). 
Mondragoón’s trustee-representative democratic structure is vulnerable to the same criticism as state-level 
representative democracies: the argument has been used since democracy’s birth in ancient Greece that using 
representative tiers, each of which leave room for discretion and use of trustees’ personal judgment, lessens the 
real power held by the general public in the lowest tier (see e.g. Robertson 2002: 148-9). A separate real-life 
example of this can be found in a 2006 study of coffee producing Fairtrade co-operatives in Guatemala, where 
only 3 out of 53 members of multi-tier trustee-style co-ops had even heard of the term Fairtrade, indicating that 
they had very limited knowledge and control of their own co-operatives’ dealings with the global North or other 
companies higher up the value chain (Lyon 2006: 459-460). However, though co-operative democratic 
structures may be watered down through the use of tiers or trustee discretionary freedom, this form of 
governance is starkly different from that of a capitalist firm, which typically allows no formal decision-making 
power for its workers whatsoever (Macleod and Reed 2009: 120-125). 
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Another type of democratic structure is a flatter structure without any permanent differentiation of 
responsibility. One co-operative that uses such a structure is Radical Routes, a British secondary co-op where 
co-operative enterprises and housing co-ops join together to help each other and share resources. Radical 
Routes formed in the 1980s as an overtly anti-capitalist organization, and it today offers an arena for around 40-
50 member co-ops to come together and co-operate between them, whether financially, politically, practically or 
socially (Radical Routes 2013a). Most of these member co-operatives are small housing co-ops, often individual 
residential houses or smaller housing projects in various locations in the UK. Some members are workers' co-
ops, for example social centers/venues, a printer's, a bicycle repair workshop and training centre, a co-operative 
support agency... The member co-ops are usually small, with 5-15 individual members being a typical number. 
Radical Routes is a voluntary organization, so none of its members are legally required to be a part of it or follow 
its policies – rather it works on a principle of mutual aid, and the idea is that co-operatives join because they 
share Radical Routes' aims and interests. Radical Routes’ governance structure is laid out in Figure 41.
Figure 4: Radical Routes’ Decision-Making Structure
(Compiled from Radical Routes 2013a; author’s field research) 
All member co-ops send at least one representative to attend a quarterly general meeting at a gathering hosted 
by a member co-op somewhere in the UK, where all major and strategic decisions are made (Radical Routes 
2013a). Since Radical Routes is a secondary co-op its members are co-operatives rather than individuals, but the 
governance structure could apply to a primary workers' co-op without any major alterations. Members divide 
themselves into sub-groups (called ‘working groups’), which meet and communicate more often than the 
quarterly general meetings, dealing with tasks within a specific area. These sub-groups are partly guided by 
Radical Routes’ policy documents, which are written and discussed at general meetings, and partly by 
discussions in general meetings (Ibid.; author interview). 
Radical Routes uses a consensus-favoring decision-making process, which means that consensus (i.e. agreement 
from all members that a course of action is desirable or acceptable) is sought before any majority-voting 
becomes relevant (Radical Routes 2011 Part 2 §3.11-3.16). Each final decision is discussed in the general 
meeting for up to ten minutes, and if a consensus cannot be reached within that time the discussion is continued 
at the next general meeting (Ibid.). The task is then to construct a solution that is acceptable to at least all but 
one for every twelve member co-operatives. If consensus cannot be reached, qualified majority voting is used, 
with a yes-vote for a proposed policy requiring a two-thirds majority (Ibid.). At every quarterly member 
gathering, Radical Routes organizes training workshops and discussion groups dedicated to improving member 
delegates’ ability to use consensus decision-making in a constructive way.
If a member co-operative refuses to implement a decision or policy, Radical Routes does not have any strict 
formal sanctions other than exclusion from the organization, which would only be used in very severe cases. 
Whether a member co-op actively and willfully refuses a policy, or simply fails to carry out the tasks that are 
required of it (such as sending delegates to gatherings, responding to e-mails, etc), the issue is discussed at 
1 A few words on my methodology in researching Radical Routes: my empirical research consists of ethnography in the form 
of going to open organisational meetings, a few interviews, and using policy documents. The four in-depth interviews took 
place at a quarterly Radical Routes gathering over three rainy days in August 2010.
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quarterly general gatherings with the aim of resolving it informally. In serious cases the sub-group for 
Development, a group focusing on the organizational improvement of member co-ops, can step in and offer in-
depth mediation, training and advice. Generally, however, issues are resolved in an amiable fashion, and any 
disagreements with policies are discussed openly at gatherings (author interviews). 
Representing a member co-operative at the quarterly gathering and taking part in a working group are tasks 
that, as Radical Routes members state in interviews, unfortunately give those individuals more power over the 
organization than those who are not representatives. To remedy this, Radical Routes encourages a rotation of 
these roles, so that different individuals carry out the tasks each quarter, half-year or year, the time period 
depending on the task at hand. 
As we see from comparing Mondragoón’s and Radical Routes’ decision-making structures, there are different 
interpretations of ICA’s principle of democratic member control, and they challenge capitalism’s division of 
labor between workers and owner-authority figures to different degrees. A key point to note here is that 
Mondragoón has over 80,000 member individuals, while Radical Routes merely has something in the region of 
500. One common analysis is that the size of an organization determines its ability to be genuinely democratic: 
the larger the group, the more difficult and the less rewarding it can be for individuals to participate (Birchall 
and Simmons 2004: 489). Another related analysis is that genuine democracy only is possible in smaller 
organizations because, if a co-operative grows too large, ‘democratic decision-making simply becomes too 
cumbersome and conflictual to allow for effective business practices’ (discussed in Olin Wright 2008: 168). 
As Birchall and Simmons show, there is empirically some truth in this, and the research and debate required by 
all members in a more inclusive democracy undeniably takes up time and resources (2004; Olin Wright 2008: 
168-169). Two points should be noted regarding this argument, however: firstly that other moral-political 
values can trump the value of organizational efficiency or decision-making speed. After all, it could easily be 
argued that state dictatorship is a much quicker way of making decisions on a national scale than democracy is, 
but this argument is unlikely to persuade many citizens of democratic countries to convert into a dictatorship. 
Indeed, my interviewees stated that having a democratic voice generally felt more important to them than 
achieving higher organizational efficiency.
Secondly, a meaningful democratic structure can be maintained even with – or perhaps only with (Erdal 2011) – 
some tiers of delegated representation. One interviewee from Radical Routes pointed out that temporarily 
delegated and individually assigned responsibilities do not lessen the level of democracy, as long as roles are, 
firstly delegated (see above), and secondly rotated frequently, encouraging all members to take on delegated 
responsibility at some point, if they want to. The interviewee describes having come across many housing co-
operatives which, when a task or project arises, designates a ‘gaffer who particularly follows through that job, 
[…] but this kind of management role is only a temporary thing’. As we have seen, ‘temporary’ should in the case 
of Radical Routes be understood in terms of weeks or months, rather than years as in the case of Mondragoón’s 
standing committee and council (see Bakaikoa et al 2004 for the latter). 
There is, I would argue, one caveat to the desirability of this rotational system. More permanent positions on the 
mainstream job market tend to be staffed through formal application and selection processes, requiring 
evidence of experience and skills as well as references. This is not currently standard practice in Radical Routes, 
though there is no logical reason it could not be: applications could be scrutinized by delegates from each 
member co-operative according to certain agreed criteria. Each time a role is created, which is usually done in a 
general meeting, a decision could also be made regarding whether the role should be staffed through a formal 
selection process. 
Rotating roles thus increases the amount of democracy in an organization, and this can bring challenges as well 
as strengths. As is evidenced in Feldman and Brett 1983, each time someone enters a new job role there might 
be a settling-in period (learning how systems work, getting familiar with tasks, etc). The more often a role 
rotates, the more settling-in periods will be incurred, which could have a negative impact on the organization’s 
efficiency in the sense that time goes into individual new learning instead of direct production. But studies of job 
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rotation show that other gains can be made instead: employees become more versatile and can stand in for each 
other when needed, employees understand each others' roles better and can therefore carry out their own roles 
in a way that better serves the team as a whole, and the organization itself – if efficiency of production is a highly 
prioritized value – can learn which employees are better at which tasks by observing staff as they rotate (Ortega 
2001; Eriksson and Ortega 2006).
As we have seen, there are many grey areas when discussing democratic member control and its ability to 
challenge capitalist private ownership. Whether any specific multi-tiered organization is ‘genuinely’ democratic 
is an empirical question that varies from case to case, but the discussion on democracy can here be distilled into 
this point: if democracy is the ‘rule of the people’ (deêmos kratos), member control is democratic to the extent 
that members take part in decision-making procedures, take on rotating delegated roles, and feel empowered. In 
times of practical necessity (when quick decisions are needed and the organization’s short-term viability is at 
risk if they cannot be produced) representatives may need to use their own judgment and act as trustees, but 
under normal circumstances the use of delegates is preferable. 
This is not to say that such a co-operative organizational form is an automatic path to true democracy: as many 
writers point out, formal democratic procedures sometimes conceal informal hierarchies, for example along 
traditional gender and class divisions (Miller 2012; Ross 2002). But the use of rotating roles of responsibility 
and open continual training and discussion about access to decision-making can make the anti-capitalist co-
operative an exceptionally progressive organizational model. 
This is part of the more general point that co-operatives, to the extent that they have open membership (and 
thereby ownership) and democratic member control, exist without the capitalist idea of private property and its 
ensuing division of labor.
Regarding Profit
Profit in capitalism is the financial surplus made from commercial activity after expenses incurred by it have 
been deducted (OED 2013a). What makes the capitalist conception of profit distinctive is that profit not only is 
desired in general but is central to human motivation. Furthermore, profit should not only accrue, but 
continuously grow. Let us now look at how co-operatives can function without the profit element.
Member Economic Participation, the third ICA principle, states that ‘Members allocate surpluses for any or all of 
the following purposes: developing their co-operative […]; benefiting members in proportion to their 
transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership’ (ICA 2011b). 
Just like the first and second principles, this can be interpreted in different ways. The Co-operative Group (the 
world’s largest consumer co-operative including The Co-operative supermarkets), for example, realizes this 
principle through giving all members a cash share of the company’s surplus bi-annually, the dividend portion 
size being determined by the amount of money spent in the supermarkets during that period by the member in 
question (The Co-operative Group 2013a). While this ‘benefit[s] members in proportion to their transactions 
with the co-operative’, it does not challenge the idea of capitalist profit – it merely distributes the profit between 
co-op members.
Though most co-operatives are for profit in this way, many co-operatives choose to organize as not-for-profit. 
One example is cafeó Kino – a workers' co-operative vegan cafeó with around 15 members based in Bristol, 
England – which states in its Articles of Association that any surplus made shall either be reinvested into the co-
op itself or donated to other not-for-profit co-operatives, charities or socially beneficial causes (Cafeó Kino 2009: 
§62). There is a flat rate wage in the co-op, so all staff are paid the same hourly amount, which is the national 
minimum wage. There is thus a cap on wage levels, ensuring that while staff can earn a decent living from their 
jobs, no individual member of the co-operative is going to get abnormally rich. There have been discussions in 
Cafeó Kino since its start in 2006 about whether the national minimum wage is indeed a 'decent' income, but the 
organization’s financial reality has prevented any wage increases above the minimum wage.
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Mondragoón has also chosen to limit individual members' incomes to avoid anybody amassing exceptional 
wealth from the organization. Internally, incomes are limited through the use of maximum wage ratios between 
the least qualified workers and top executives to avoid the grotesque differences in income between bosses and 
workers seen in many capitalist corporations. Historically these ratios have been very low, allowing executives 
to earn only three times as much as the lowest qualified worker, but in recent years Mondragoón has been forced 
to ease off on these restraints and now offers executive wages at roughly a third under market levels 
(Mondragoón 2013c). Externally, the co-operative has set solidarity wage caps that ensure Mondragoón members 
do not earn notably more or less than the average worker of any other company in the same sector and 
geographical region (Ibid.; Gibson-Graham 2006: 114). 
When Mondragoón makes a surplus, a certain portion (about ten percent) is donated to social or charitable 
projects. The rest is reinvested into the co-operative and/or eventually handed out to members as a dividend. A 
smaller share of this surplus is reinvested in the co-operative directly to promote growth and improvement. A 
larger share, around 70 percent, is distributed among Mondragoón's individual members – but only when they 
retire or otherwise leave the co-op. This money is deposited into savings accounts that belong to each of the co-
operative's members and that are held in Mondragoón's own credit union Caja Laboral. This mechanism could be 
described as a kind of compulsory saving: the money held in these accounts is invested in Mondragoón's member 
co-operatives or used to expand into new co-operatives, and the individual savers are not normally free to 
withdraw this money until they leave Mondragoón. They can, however, benefit from interest payments from 
these savings, and they can use the accounts as collateral for private loans (Gibson-Graham 2006: 115). 
Looking to Radical Routes again, we find yet another interpretation of ICA's third principle. Radical Routes does 
not have a specific policy on profit – instead it deals with the issue through focusing directly on the income cap. 
Its policy document states that two thirds of its member co-ops must have a policy limiting the permitted 
absolute income of all co-op members to maximum twice the amount they would receive on governmental 
income support benefits each year (Radical Routes 2011: Part 1 §6.1, 2013a; author interviews). Thus, even if 
such a co-operative’s dividend is shared out among members, none of its members will earn a wage that could 
be described as exceptionally high in relation to the national average. This is a roundabout way of ensuring 
member co-ops are not profit-driven – the reason a more direct policy has not been written being that not all 
member co-ops distinguish between wages and surplus, often operating on a ‘from each according to ability, to 
each according to need’-basis in a traditional Marxist spirit, rather than having stipulated monthly wages 
(author interviews; Marx 1999 [1875]). 
This latter point raises the question of how we can distinguish between profit (or dividends) and wages in a co-
operative. If members of a workers' co-op or a community co-op decide what their own wages should be, the 
distinction becomes less obvious: the wages and the potential surplus are coming from the same pool of money. 
Members of a co-operative could thus in theory siphon off money from the surplus by setting their wages at a 
higher level. They could price their goods and services more expensively, not to make a profit, but to earn a 
higher wage, which is a meaningless distinction in practice. That explains why both Cafeó Kino and Radical 
Routes have decided to put a cap on individual earnings, ensuring that their members are motivated not by the 
pursuit of profit, but by other aims.
Does this mean it is capitalist to amass exceptional amounts of wealth? In Marx's conception of exploitation 
discussed above, the crux was not the creation of wealth in itself, but the transfer of wealth from the laborers to 
the owners of the means of production. In a co-operative there is no such distinction – all members are both 
contributors and owners simultaneously. (Excepted are those co-operatives that employ additional wage 
laborers without offering them an opportunity to join the co-op as members.) But if an individual amasses 
exceptional amounts of wealth as a result of their own labor, is that capitalist? For Marx the answer was no. 
Granted, for Marx a higher and more advanced form of communism would distribute resources according to 
need and not ability, so amassing exceptional wealth would not be relevant there. But Marx also described 
socialism (a less advanced form of communism) as entitling workers to goods containing the same number of 
hours of social labor as they had individually spent – so those who worked more would be entitled to more 
resources (Marx 1999 [1875]). However, even if exceptional wealth accumulation in non-capitalist economies 
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strictly speaking could be possible, it is quite clear that no reasonable conception of a Marxist, or socialist, 
radically democratic egalitarian society would be built on personal exceptional wealth accumulation as a main 
productive motivator.
Capitalist theory typically assumes that profit is the incentive behind any commercial enterprise, without which 
people would not be driven to ‘serv[e] customer needs’, become efficient, innovate and progress (Hill 2005: 48). 
The prolificacy and success of not-for-profit organizations worldwide (see Steinberg and Weisbrod 2008, 
Gibson-Graham 2006), of which non-profit co-operatives are only one form, indicate that this assumption is not 
correct about large portions of humanity, if about anybody.
Unlike not-for-profit companies, profit-motivated companies are prone to be driven to disregard human rights 
issues in their pursuit of profit. Examples here include allegations by the BBC and the NGO People & Planet that 
British retailer Topshop has been buying cotton harvested by forced child labor in Uzbekistan (BBC 2007, 
People & Planet 2008). Similarly, The Coca-Cola Company has displayed repeated criminal and violent behavior, 
whether selling waste products from a bottling plant in Kerala as a fertilizer to local farmers, which turned out 
to contain dangerous levels of cadmium and lead (BBC 2003, India Resource Center 2013) or assassinating 
union leaders in Colombia (Killer Coke 2013). Innumerable similar allegations have been made by NGOs against 
various multinational corporations. By treating profit as the main justification for and driver of any commercial 
enterprise, capitalist theory cannot logically result in practices that seriously regard either long-term (e.g. 50+ 
years) or collective consequences. Some for-profit companies do engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
schemes that consider wider or more long-term consequences of their activities, for example by sponsoring 
hospitals, water projects or animal protection schemes. However, many writers agree that CSR schemes are 
motivated either by a company’s need to improve their public image and possibly divert attention from its 
otherwise harmful practices – or by motives other than profit (e.g. moral sentiment) (Kolstad 2007: 143; Van 
Tulder and van der Zwart 2006: 134; Schaefer 2008). Being not-for-profit is thus, following the argument laid 
out here, a necessary part of ensuring co-op members are not motivated (only or mainly) by short-term 
individual interest. 
In the absence of the guiding principle of profit, other principles will have to take its place. This is an area where 
ICA’s principles fail to provide satisfactory guidance. Only principle 7 is relevant, stating that co-operatives shall 
have a ‘Concern for community’ – a more specific meaning of which is not given. This could feasibly be 
interpreted as calling for outcomes that increase the cohesion, feeling of belonging and fellowship, life 
opportunities or otherwise well-being of people within a specific geographic area in which the co-operative is 
based, or of a marginalized group (see OED 2013b). However, this is quite vague and does not provide 
sufficiently specific guidance for how co-ops can operate in a non-capitalist way.
Many not-for-profit co-operatives write their own policies on what principles, in addition to ICA’s seventh 
principle, should guide them instead of profit. Interesting principles summarized from existing not-for-profit co-
operatives’ policies include: providing high quality and useful services/products at affordable prices; being both 
economically and environmentally sustainable; and offering mutual gain for all stakeholders (see Radical Routes 
2011; Cafeó Kino 2013; Kebele Community Co-operative 2013; author interviews). We will return to this shortly.
Regarding (Intra-Market) Competition
In free market capitalism, privately owned firms seek to gain profit by competing against each other. Capitalist 
theorists generally hold that monopoly (i.e. the existence of only one firm providing a specific good or service to 
many different customers) is an undesirable thing: as firms compete against each other for customers they 
lower their prices, increase efficiency, increase product quality, and are in other ways forced to give customers a 
better deal (Stigler 2008). 
In my analysis of capitalism I make a distinction between competition between firms in different markets, and 
between firms in the same (or very similar) markets. Firstly, capitalism heavily promotes competition in general, 
and secondly, it heavily promotes intra-market competition, i.e. competition within markets. Since capitalism 
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contains no central element of co-operation between firms and since the sole aim of each firm is to make a profit 
for its owner(s), firms are driven to offer products or services equivalent to those that already exist, but at a 
cheaper price or with more persuasive branding and advertising (Bowles et al 2005: 257, Stigler 2008). 
The word ‘market’ simply denotes the extent of demand for a product or service on offer. Thus, distinguishing 
between different markets can be very difficult: for example, is a vegetarian restaurant competing in the same 
market as a nearby steakhouse? The answer to this question will vary depending on the context. Though it is 
difficult to define a specific market in generalized theoretical discussion, firms and market researchers do 
confidently distinguish between different markets in practice, often using stipulative definitions (see Hill 2005: 
584-587; Gupta 2008). The distinction between inter- and intra-market competition is therefore not 
nonsensical. 
As long as citizens’ consumption is not planned by the government as in state socialism (see Ericson 2008), 
competition between markets is inevitable: for every product or service offered there are other, perhaps greatly 
different, products or services a customer might choose instead. For example, instead of buying a car, a 
customer might choose to buy a bicycle (Stigler 2008). Not-for-profit co-operatives can therefore not avoid 
competing in this way – but they can avoid competing with firms in the same or similar markets. When asked 
about this in an interview, one co-operative activist stated that ‘part of setting up a co-op [is] looking around at 
other services and seeing what is required. […] [Y]ou wouldn’t set up something that competed with an existing 
co-op’. Before a not-for-profit co-operative is set up to serve a need, members would survey and contact other 
similar co-operatives and discuss whether a new co-op could be introduced without damaging existing ones. 
In capitalist theory such a lack of rivalry would be disastrous: what is to incentivize a market’s lone firm to 
achieve efficiency and serve customers well? One of the most oft-cited terms in capitalist economic theory is the 
‘invisible hand’, coined of course by Adam Smith, referring to the idea that individuals acting in their own self-
interest will, if left undisturbed by state regulation, render social consequences that are ‘harmonious in mutually 
promoting the interests of all members of society’ (Blaug 2008; see also Smith 2002 [1776]: Book IV, Chapter II). 
In other words, free market capitalism is built on the idea that a rivalry of all against all will bring about a good 
outcome for everyone: producers are driven to become better at what they do, and consumers get a better deal. 
This means that capitalism not only promotes intra-market competition specifically, but also competition as a 
value in general. This is true for capitalism’s economic theory but also for its wider cultural and political world-
view (Harvey 2005: ch1; Duchrow 2005: 34; Lazzarato 2009).
Accumulation of profit means that individual actors who do well can achieve economies of scale, brand strength 
and advertising advantages, and can accumulate yet more profit by investing their saved surplus in other, 
separate, profitable ventures (Bowles et al 2005: 151, 394). On a cultural level, individuals are widely differently 
equipped through social hierarchies and class (Olin Wright 2008: 32). Postmodern critics in the vein of Michel 
Foucault, critical theorists and postmodern feminists would argue that the elevation of competition as a 
principle to guide social and economic interaction is in fact a tool of oppression and distribution of wealth from 
the poor to the rich (see Lazzarato 2009; Cox 1996; Salih 2002: 38; Young 2003: 113). 
Not-for-profit co-operatives, however, can function fully without the capitalist logic of competition. Since they 
are not motivated by profit, there are other driving forces: most notably (and simply) the will to provide the 
services or goods they were set up to provide; and maybe additionally offering customers affordable prices and 
good service, as we saw above (see also Co-operatives UK 2009: ch 2). Without making unfounded assumptions 
about human nature, it is difficult to prove that humans need competition to be able to engage in useful 
productive activities (see Steinberg and Weisbrod 2008). 
What remains true as I have already argued, is that not-for-profit co-operatives inevitably will compete against 
each other across markets. Competition thus does play a role in incentivizing co-op members to work hard, but it 
should be noted that this fact is seen by non-capitalist co-operatives as an unfortunate fact of life rather than (as 
in capitalism) an inspiration and positive driving force. This reluctant attitude is evidenced in ICA’s sixth 
principle – Co-operation among co-operatives – which attempts to replace competition with co-operation 
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wherever possible. 
This principle, like the others, can be interpreted in different ways. The British Co-operative Group (of 
supermarkets, banking, etc) realizes ‘co-operation among co-operatives’ through being a member of the national 
trade body Co-operatives UK, which ‘campaigns for co-operation and works to promote, develop and unite co-
operative enterprises’ and which is not a non-capitalist organization (Co-operatives UK 2013; The Co-operative 
Group 2013b). 
Radical Routes and its member co-operatives interpret the sixth principle more narrowly. Many Radical Routes 
co-ops are also members of Co-operatives UK, but have policies that demand even thicker co-operation with 
other Radical Routes members. Radical Routes can be described to fulfill ICA’s sixth principle in three main 
ways, laid out in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Activities Undertaken by Radical Routes to Fulfil ICA’s Sixth Principle
(Compiled from Radical Routes 2009; author’s field research)
Radical Routes’ quarterly gatherings are dedicated to meetings, workshops, discussions and social events that 
allow member co-operatives to discuss their own and each other’s strengths, weaknesses, challenges, needs and 
resources (Radical Routes 2013a). Co-op representatives share experiences through discussing and giving 
advice, but also through sharing informational materials and bureaucratic documents such as policies or 
accounts. Gatherings allow members to meet face-to-face, but the sharing of skills and information continues via 
the internet or telephone in between them when members need help with specific questions. Gatherings also 
prompt member co-operatives to request and share in-kind resources such as vehicles, equipment and labor 
power. In-kind requests can also be made via the internet or telephone in between gatherings. 
Through its investment arm Rootstock, Radical Routes allows member co-operatives to access loans at favorable 
interest rates (currently 0%, 1.5% or 3%, depending on the interest investors request) and flexible repayment 
schedules (Rootstock 2013a). Anyone who is interested and who agrees with Rootstock’s and Radical Routes’ 
policies can invest their savings in it – technically this is done by buying shares in Rootstock, but in practice this 
transition is not much different to an investor from opening a savings account with a bank and transferring 
money there, or transferring it back when needed, as long as notice is given (Rootstock 2010a; author 
interviews). Rootstock lends money to Radical Routes’ member co-ops only, and decisions about whether and 
how much to lend is made by Radical Routes through network-wide consensus (Rootstock 2009). Investors can 
be both individuals and co-operatives, and it should be noted that Radical Routes has a policy stating that ‘We 
encourage/expect members of member co-ops to invest some of their capital (if they have any) in Radical 
Routes or its member co-ops’ (Radical Routes 2011: Part 1 §7.1). 
Effectively, then, this is a system of surplus-sharing: if a member co-operative or any otherwise interested 
individual makes a surplus beyond their individual/firm needs (a reference point for which is indicated in policy 
§6.1 discussed above), it is shared with other Radical Routes co-operatives.
A possible problem for co-operatives, applicable also to investment organizations such as Rootstock, is pointed 
out by Darryl Reed: co-operatives ‘tend to be under-capitalized because members have little incentive to invest 
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(because their shares do not appreciate […])’ (2009: 25). Put simply: long-term collective gains such as social 
equality, reduced global poverty and environmental sustainability may not always be attractive incentives for 
rich people to invest. Radical Routes has had access to over £770,000 since it started lending in 1991 (Rootstock 
2010b), which for a small voluntary organization is significant. Investing money in Rootstock is open to 
anybody, not just member co-operatives, so Rootstock can find capital from an open pool of anybody who is 
willing to lend money at an interest of up to 3%, and with a notice period of thirteen weeks ahead of any 
withdrawal. The option of lending at no interest is available to Rootstock investors, and the application form for 
lenders states that investment in Rootstock should be seen as a way of supporting the organization’s aims rather 
than as a source of financial gain (Rootstock 2013b). To split hairs, the fact that interest rates of up to 3% are 
available means that Rootstock does (if to a very limited extent) make use of the profit motive in attracting 
investors. However, even if 3% is a relatively high interest rate for a savings account in Britain in the current 
economic climate, it will hardly attract any profit-obsessed venture capitalists, and even if it did, they would not 
have any decision-making powers in the co-operative.
Returning to Mondragoón again, we can find a different solution to the undercapitalization problem. Mondragoón 
requires its members to deposit a large joining fee of roughly a year's salary, which can be paid off in 
installments over a period of several years (Arando et al 2010: 32). It is questionable, however, whether this 
solution is open to smaller co-operatives that are unable to guarantee an installment payment plan, or even 
long-term employment stability. If members were required to put up a lump sum in order to join, without the 
option of paying the membership fee in small installments, the principle of open membership (ICA Principle 1) 
would be violated. For smaller co-operatives undercapitalization is often a major problem, whether the source of 
capital would be private individuals or conventional banks (Dubravcčicó 2000: 83). Of course, that small anti-
capitalist organizations find it difficult to attract capital is neither surprising nor puzzling. Nor does it make the 
reality of existing non-capitalist alternatives any less interesting.
Conclusion
Radical Routes, Rootstock, Mondragoón, Cafeó Kino and other co-operatives discussed here show that a non-
capitalist and egalitarian productive enterprise form is possible, and indeed already in existence. These co-
operatives do not distinguish between the owners of the means of production on the one hand and workers on 
the other, rather, the two roles are merged. In practice this happens through the use of delegated and rotating 
roles of responsibility (with the frequency of rotation and amount of room for personal discretion varying but 
being as high and low as possible respectively). As for profit, these co-operatives find various ways of ensuring 
the motive behind their enterprises is not to amass individual wealth: they make their enterprises non-profit, 
using income caps and surplus sharing. When the profit motive is exchanged for organizational aims that are 
more collective and long-term, companies no longer have the incentive to violate human rights or the 
environment. And as for capitalism's obsession with competition, these co-operative enterprises co-operate 
with each other through networks such as Radical Routes, sharing skills and resources rather than trying to put 
each other out of business.
A common criticism of radical alternative economic models is that they are unlikely to work in practice, but the 
success and strength of anti-capitalist co-operatives such as these make such a criticism difficult to maintain.
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